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Towards the end of the academic year of 2011-12, the head of the department of English and Humanities at Birkbeck asked me if I could start thinking about present we could buy for Steve Connor, who was leaving the college after over thirty years of service. There were various complications, not least the fact that Steve had sought to make everyone’s life easier (or harder as it turned out), by asking that any monies that would normally be spent on presents for him should be donated to the charity Médecins Sans Frontières. Given that the department still felt that we wanted to give something to Steve, alongside honouring his wish that something be given in his name, I started to think about gifts that might be procured without much money changing hands. As scholars, we are fortunate enough to be able to spend at least some portion of our working lives thinking and writing about what might glibly be termed our favourite things. But unlike many of us, whose scholarly interests focused through the lens of a present would lead inevitably to first editions, engravings, or other such expenses, Steve had written a book about the interest, indeed the joy, he takes in objects which kick around in handbags or languish in the backs of drawers. Paraphernalia: The Curious Lives of Magical Things (2011) is precisely about those overlooked thingamebobs and fidgets that don’t get put on show and have almost no monetary value, but that gather and cluster, according to their own modes of strange attraction, as things too freighted with other investments either in the past or in the imagined future, simply to be thrown away. Buttons, batteries, cards, combs, glasses, and, indeed, handkerchiefs. But of course, I couldn’t simply load Steve up with my aleatory collections of furry cough sweets and crustily decrepit elastic bands, or the monogrammed hankies given by long-dead great aunties and grandmas that wait obediently in my drawers, smug in the knowledge that I will neither use them nor ever give them away. So I started to hunt for another way of thinking about these objects, and it was in this context that my hand alighted on a slim volume in a second hand bookshop that I had once seen in a friend’s house and fallen slightly in love with – a book entitled, simply, Out of a Handkerchief. 
	Published by Hammond, Hammond and Company Ltd of Great Russell St in 1943, Out of a Handkerchief by Frances E. Jacobs offers the interested adult a new skill. According to the flyleaf:

All you need is a man’s handkerchief measuring 14 x 14 inches, with an eighth- inch hem, and half a dozen rubber bands or pieces of string if no rubber bands are available. With this material you can make anything from a rabbit to a hippopotamus, an elephant, a snowman, or a really graceful dancer.​[1]​

Alongside the delight I found in the mid-century modern homespun Gill Sans, and the aesthetic pleasures of the dulled austerity limitations of colour palette, something else began to grow. The book’s imagined creatures had none of the crisp beauty of Japanese origami cranes. No: these animals and figures from out of a handkerchief were lumpen, decidedly uncanny, as if a seemingly essential formlessness shaped itself contingently, temporarily, into approximate likenesses of things. Somehow these things made out of a handkerchief already looked peculiarly second hand, or, in that word favoured by the vintage fashion industry, ‘pre-loved’. And I began to think that what was perhaps uncanny about the imagined objects within the book was that they stage the idea of an adult making and giving back to a child precisely the kind of object that very small children first pick as their own: the plush but soon to be threadbare rabbit; the bear whose eyes and nose will be worried away; the frayed malleability of fabric, twisted and invested with shapes beyond itself. 
	It was, of course, the British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott who, more than any other, worked to understand and explain the force and meaning of such ‘transitional objects’ in the psychic life of children. In work begun in 1951, Winnicott describes these first objects as things that reside in, and indeed shape, a space between the child’s internal psychic experience and an external, shared reality. The infant, who is completely dependent, experiences itself and its primary care-giver (usually the mother) as one and the same. The mother ‘brings the world’ to the infant without delay, vitally feeding its sense of omnipotence and fulfilled desire. As the child grows, however, it begins to gain an awareness of its lack of absolute power, which it experiences as a loss, and in coming to a sense of the separation between itself and its desired object, it begins to be aware that the mother is a person with a life of her own. Winnicott argues that the child now realizes that it is dependent on the external world and on others over which it has only limited control, and this inevitably produces frustration and anxiety. The transitional object is one of the first possessions that belongs to the child, and one over which it is allowed much control, although it is vitally understood to be ‘not me’. In Winnicott’s words, such an object is ‘affectionately cuddled as well as excitedly loved and mutilated’, for the child must be able to invest it with a life: ‘it must seem to the infant to give warmth, or to move, or to have texture, or to do something that seems to show it has a vitality or reality of its own’.​[2]​ Through the use of the transitional object the child is able to stage a fantasized bond with the mother figure as she separates for increasingly long periods of time, finding her and her ability to give comfort in a transitional space between its inner reality and that of the outside world. For Winnicott, it is this vital early experience of play, of bringing imagination to bear on an external world that yields to it and yet retains something of its own contours, that allows the child to develop one of its central capacities: ‘the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated’.​[3]​ For Winnicott, it is the mother figure that first helps the baby into this transitional space, as she moves ‘“to and fro” between being that which the baby has the capacity to find and (alternatively) being herself waiting to be found’.​[4]​ Winnicott indeed argues that it is the parent and child between them that carve out something upon which all subsequent cultural activity depends – a space and time in which we can play with a world that yields to us and takes our impression, but that maintains enough of its own plastic quality to retain its particular shape.
	In Paraphernalia, which begins with a baby playing with the strap of its mother’s handbag, Steven Connor speaks of magical objects as things that precisely inhabit what might be thought of, after Winnicott, as this transitional space between inner and outer reality. For, in Connor’s terms, such an object, though never anything other than absolutely ordinary and material, also seems to be able ‘to escape its own finitude, its dourly objectish being-there, to go beyond, or spill to the side of, what it merely is or does’.​[5]​ We lend these objects our curious investments, while simultaneously finding in a materiality that exists before and beyond us, attitudes that form and mould our own shapes of being. As Connor affirms, the magic of such objects therefore lies in their double articulation, the fact that they ‘give us work to do as well as merely being available for us to work on’.​[6]​ 
	In a talk entitled ‘Feeling Things’ from June 2012, Connor makes clear his indebtedness to the psychoanalytic school of ‘object relations’ and notions of transitional space in his thinking about playful work, this work of play, that the world of objects seems to draw from us. There, he writes: 

The role of objects is to resist our assimilation. Objects must be able, as D.W. Winnicott so wisely says, not just to receive our love, but also to survive it (Winnicott 2005, 3). We are impelled to try to assimilate to ourselves that to
which we have feelings of attachment, but if we were ever actually able or allowed to assimilate them, we would have succeeded only in annihilating them, and, with them, the tension between them and us that keeps us in being. It is for this reason that the things Winnicott calls transitional objects, comfort blankets and the like, have ‘the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated’ (Winnicott 2005, 3). The animism of children is indeed primitive, because to mistake things for the kind of thing I am, and to attribute to them the kind of inaccessible innerness that I assume I have, is to dwell in the magical dream of the omnipotence of thought, rather than to draw out thought’s impotential. We can never reach the things of the world, which is exactly why they are so indispensable to us, since only things can give us the faculty of reaching out, of extending into the world. Only by not giving themselves to me can things help give me to myself, by embodying the possibility that there is in fact a world for me to be in that is more than my own autistic empire of self- seeming, which is to say the saving possibility that I may not be everything (‘They told me I was every thing: ‘tis a lie. I am not ague-proof’ says King Lear.) The only way to be delivered from the illusion of being everything, from the soul-death that such absolute and all-encompassing selfhood must be, is through the possibility of pathos amounting sometimes to agony that objects keep open.​[7]​

This work on objects and their relations, which Connor dubbed Cultural Phenomenology in 2000,​[8]​ works as an early articulation of what those many writers who have turned to the history and present of things in the last decade have tended to call ‘thing theory’, after Bill Brown’s essay in 2001.​[9]​ But for me, it is Connor’s mode of bringing cultural history alongside an attention to the specifically embodied, subjective experience characteristic of phenomenology, that has been particularly useful in showing how those crude arguments between various stripes of realism and the swear word of social constructivism that culture never quite seems to have done with, might benefit from being addressed by modes of thinking capable of keeping ‘inner and outer reality separate but interrelated’. For, of course, the world of material phenomena is neither sufficiently weak that it is simply there, waiting to be dominated and reformed under humanity’s observational and discursive power; but nor is it so strong that it resists completely the cords that bind it to our interests, beliefs, ideas, and representations. The space of culture in which we both meet and make the world is precisely this place of to and fro, inner and outer – a space that might be described, using a term that Connor unfolds elsewhere in his work, as one traced through with ‘strong weakness’.​[10]​ The handkerchief is malleable, mouldable, but as it is brought into contact with a band or two, it can maintain its shape. 
	In the chapter on handkerchiefs in Paraphernalia, Connor posits that one of their magical qualities is their ability to contain. Handkerchiefs absorb tears without simply staunching them; the imagined runaway gathers their possessions into a spotted one; storks are said to nestle babies in them; holidaying or reverent head gets covered in them; the handkerchief is never so far very from the final winding sheet, the shroud.​[11]​ In Connor’s writing, the material qualities of handkerchiefs are understood as being in concert with their uses, irradiated with what J. J. Gibson calls their ‘affordance’, their physical invitation to us. As such they become forms that allow both external investments and immanent, inner, potentials and structures – a sort of object unconscious – to speak. And it is with this idea of a handkerchief as a malleable, ad hoc, container that I want to return to Out of a Handkerchief. This odd little book, with its strange magic. Out of something that most people in the period would simply have had to hand, out of something that can wipe away tears, clean what is dirty, hold one’s worldly goods, provide an imagined first nest for a baby, cover the face of a corpse for its final moments in the realm of culture, the adult imagines making primitive playthings. Published in London in 1943, the flyleaf tells us:

Here is the perfect gift for Christmas, birthdays, and special occasions. Above all, parents or anyone called upon to amuse, will find it an especial boon at children’s parties, or in an air-raid shelter.

With moving explicitness, the book tells us that, as with the use of a handkerchief in a magic trick, these scraps of fabric may be used for misdirection, to divert the attention and hold it in another kind of container:

If you want to hold your audience, adult or juvenile, there is no better way than making something before their very eyes. Restless, or even frightened children will at once be fascinated by the ingenious tricks which are explained and illustrated in this excellent little book. (ital. mine)

So what emerges, then, is an image of very frightened children, and the very frightened adults tasked with holding on to their most primal of fears – the fear of annihilation – and searching for a way of decanting the traumatic passivity of waiting, of gathering up the painful, dreadful distension of time, into another kind of shape. The soldier’s hat; the bride; the baby – in the face of the destructive force of war, a moment is held through and within play, and a particular shape of culture, temporarily, with and through pathos, is affirmed.   
	In a short essay from 2005 on play, Connor has noted that ‘[w]hile most cultures occupy themselves with play, the preoccupation with the nature of play seems to be a defining feature of the kind of organized and integrated societies we have come to call modern’.​[12]​ He goes on to suggest that a peculiarly modern notion of play emerges and finds its most assertive expressions in the Romantic, Enlightenment thought in which it becomes a ‘legislated release’ from the increasing rationalization and discipline of work, framed inside a rigid container of publicly accountable time. The surplus time produced by such systems of work, which leads to the invention of leisure time, is indeed one way that capitalism is deemed to subordinate even its outside to its internal rule. As Connor notes, this leads in turn to the ‘kind of protective idealization, even a fetishisation of the idea of play’,​[13]​ which is to be found, for example, in Johann Huizinga’s famous 1938 declaration in Homo Ludens that play is vital to the construction of human culture and sociality and represents the possibility of freedom from its putative instrumentalization.​[14]​ While not disagreeing with Connor’s sense that the modern conception of play is determined by its tense, mutually dependent, relationship with the world of work, I would like to suggest that Huizinga's, and indeed Winnicott’s, emphasis on the value of play perhaps also needs to be understood within a climate dominated by modern warfare. For Huizinga, writing as the shadow of impending war was falling across Europe for the second time in less than three decades, play is the freedom to mark limits in space and time. But modern war has little respect for even the martial culture ​that understands itself to be bound by the rules of the game; instead, modern war produces an absolute levelling off of the human capacity to choose to play in a momentary elsewhere.  Winnicott’s emphasis on play, not in opposition to work but as the work that children do, and the vital, structuring importance of spaces of containment, could also usefully be thought alongside the legacy of war. Winnicott had, after all, served as a consultant psychiatrist to the evacuee programme. 
	In ‘CP: Making an Issue of Cultural Phenomenology’, Connor describes how in the late 1990s, he found himself wanting to undertake a new kind of writing: 

This writing had no other prompt than a sense of fondness for certain things about certain kinds of work that I saw around me, and an itch to be relieved from the disciplinary squeezes I put on myself whenever I wrote. What, I wondered, if I could sometimes be given to write with more candour than rigour, more curiosity than critique, more immersion than decision, more wondering than method? What I had started to write had no more destination than it had occasion. I closed my eyes and starting supposing.​[15]​

It seems to me that he found himself wanting to undertake a writing that might solicit and begin to perform both the careful, placed absorption and the ecstatic abandon of play. Like the play that for Huizinga works as an ‘intermezzo, an interlude in our daily lives’,​[16]​ writing without destination or occasion explicitly draws attention to an interruption in the normal temporal run of things. Winnicott, too, emphasizes the importance of a moment of hesitation in play that derails precomprehended trajectories; instead, the play produces a furling and unfurling in the fabric of time in which something about the qualities and relationship between internal and external may be found as themselves, and allowed to insist in all their paradoxical complexity, rather than speedily transformed into ciphers for pre-existing ideas. This idea of a temporal suspension that produces the conditions for absorption might also be linked to the work of Wilfred Bion – the traumatized tank commander from the Great War who went on to become a psychoanalyst interested in object relations – and his idea that real thinking can only take place within a space of containment that would allow the otherness of the world to be taken into the self, held and digested over and through time, rather than peremptorily spat or shat out as contaminating. For Bion, real thinking can only occur when the all too persistent psychical processes of ‘evasion by evacuation’ are held up, or momentarily put down.​[17]​ As Steve once put it to me, in one of his moments of pithy, exacting brilliance never to be forgotten, is that for Bion, what thinking does is produce a container for time. 
	This ‘writing without a destination’ that Connor seems to be hoping for in cultural phenomenology is, then, a writing that refuses the pre-digested or the expected trajectories of following a party line, and it leads to his statement that ‘cultural phenomenology is not cultural politics’.​[18]​ Although Connor is careful in this essay to insist that his personal political commitments to socialism remain steadfast, in what some have seen as a renunciation of theory he suggests that
	
If you are interested in the problems of power, identity, ideology, and so on, that form the stock-in-trade of contemporary critical theory, all well and good; but if you are exclusively, programmatically, institutionally interested in such things, you will not be able to do cultural phenomenology. Or not at the same time.​[19]​

As the years have gone by since this essay was first published, I have heard Steve express, more than once, his exasperation at cultural theory’s obsession with articulations of power, as if this was humanity’s all-consuming desire or the preeminent quality of the world outside ourselves. And it is this renunciation of power, in terms of the institutions and discourses of literary theory and as a subject matter for critical thinking that seems, to me, to connect him temperamentally (although not generationally) with a philosopher/theorist to whom he most insistently returns – Michel Serres. Serres, who characterizes himself as an irenic thinker (a thinker of peace rather than of war), articulates something particular about the experience of the generation who were formed, in intellectual and somatic terms, by the traumatic passivity of being children of conflict:

This tragic atmosphere began in 1936 […] with the war in Spain, with unspeakable horrors, and culminated with the bloody settling of accounts after the Liberation in 1945; the colonial wars and some episodes of torture brought this era to a close in the early 1960s […] For us power still only means cadavers and torture.​[20]​ 

Here, the game playing of childhood has been contaminated by an exercising of adult power that seemingly leads only to pain and death. 	
Serres suggests that this violent distortion of the fabric of the world can even be seen in the ways in which we conceptualise time. Serres insists that ‘time alone can make co-possible two contradictory things’;​[21]​ ‘Hegel’s error was in reversing this logical evidence and in claiming that contradiction produces time, whereas only the opposite is true: time makes contradiction possible’.​[22]​ Hegelian time, Serres suggests, is not time at all, it is simply a line:

It’s not even a line, but a trajectory of the race for first place […] This isn’t time, but a simple competition – once again, war. Why replace temporality, duration, with a quarrel? The first to arrive, the winner of the battle, obtains as his prize the right to reinvent history to his own advantage. Once again dialectics ​– which is nothing more than the logic of appearances.​[23]​

Serres proposes that although history might be plotted on a line, or on the forcibly ironed and flattened-out handkerchief, it is the crumpled handkerchief that does more justice to the unexpected adjacencies and complex distances that describe the relationships between the moments, subjects and objects of history. Indeed, for Serres, it is the irreducible, crumpled time of unpredictable relations that lies curled between people, and between a subject and the object world, that preserves something of that world from the putative violence of thought that, for at least one strand of post-war French intellectual culture, is inexorably imbricated with the wages of war. 
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